III. 2. Empirical Results

I. Introduction
In a rapidely changing environment, companies have to meet an steadily increasing demand on their inventive capacity. Inventive and innovative potential of a Company are largely determined by its R&D activities. R&D is defined here as systematic creative activities, aimed at generating new scientific knowledge or new applications for products and processes. 1 The Output of industrial R&D significantly depends on the creative potential of its R&D personnel. This may be enhanced by particular motivation. Badawy (1988) states that "technical Professionals are not only an R&D organizatioris greatest asset but its most expensive one" 2 . Therefore, it is essential to build an effective system for the use of these human resources in order to achieve and secure inventiveness in an technical Organization. One key element of effective human resource management is the establishment of an incentive system, which activates and supports the füll potential of the R&D staff. The management challenge is the creation of conditions conducive to meeting the corporate goal of productivity and profitability, as well as R&D personnel's needs for satisfaction and motivation. In some countries special legal provisions were taken to support this management task by securing the employed inventor a share in the proceeds that the firm earns from the invention. 3 This study investigates the role of the German Employees' Inventions Law, enacted in order to encourage inventiveness and to enhance motivation of employed inventors, which should result in higher R&D Performance. In the second part of the study, an experimental design is presented that helps to measure the individual preferences of R&D Professionals with respect to certain incentive variables. Especially, the motivation potential of monetary versus non-monetary incentives will be tested, since the literature on this topic presents somewhat conflicting results. 4 The paper will close with managerial implications and some concluding remarks. 1 see Brockhoff, K., (1992) 
II. 1. Compensation for Employed Inventors
The compensation of employed inventors over and above their regulär salary is regulated differently in various countries. In Germany, for example, it is defrned by law, whereas in other countries, such as the U. S., it is usually determined by employment contract. The following chapter gives a short overview of these legal guidelines as they exist in Germany and compares these with the Situation in other countries.
II. 1.1. Legal Framework in Germany
In Germany, the relations between employees and employers are regulated by law in the so- Romania, October 6 and 7, 1992, Geneva, 1993, p. 36. employee in the enterprise. All other employees' inventions are free inventions.
The employee is obliged to report any service invention to his employer without delay ( see § 5). Within four month upon receipt of the invention report the employer may acquire all rights to the invention by an unrestricted claim made by a written declaration to the employee . By a restricted claim made within the same time period the employer can acquire a non-exclusive right to use the invention ( see § § 6 and 7). A Service invention becomes a free invention if the employer releases it or does not claim it without restrictions in due time. As soon as the employer Claims the unrestricted use of the invention, the employee is entitled to an adequate and reasonable compensation. For a claim of restrictive use, the employer is required to pay only in case of actual use. The following chapter gives more details ofhow "adequate remuneration" is to be interpreted.
II. 1. 2. Compensation Guidelines
Conceming the amount and calculation of the inventor's compensation the law simply states that it has to be reasonable, and to be based on the commercial exploitability of the service invention, the contractual duties and the position of the employee in the Company, and the company's contribution to the invention. inventor's remuneration has to be paid for each patent granted, whether used or not, as long as it is in force, and for each patent application which is used.
Without going into details, a short description ofhow the inventor's compensation is calculated follows:
The most common method to calculate the inventor's compensation is the "license analogy" method. The focus of this method is to calculate the invention value through comparison with a license fee which would have to be paid to a free outside inventor under comparable circumstances. The invention value has now to be reduced by a certain amount that reflects the companies own contributions. This is achieved by the so-called sharing factor.
The sharing factor itself is determined by three aspects: a) the degree of involvement of the employee in the formulation of the problem to be solved by the invention, The more the normal responsibility involves inventions and the higher the position of the inventor is placed in the hierachy, the smaller is his sharing factor. Whereas most industrial countries protect employees' patent rights by law, U.S. companies generally require pre-employment contracts that tum over the rights to these inventions to the employer. Furthermore, in the U.S. no special compensation is required for the assignment of an employee's invention to an employer. To encourage inventiveness, however, most American companies offer special rewards programs. These rewards programs usually offer financial rewards and rewards of a more ideal value to the employed inventor. 10
In Great Britain, a new Patents Act came into force in 1978 (Patents Act 1977). It contained provisions on the compensation of employed inventors. They are entitled to a share of the benefits resulting from "outstanding" inventions for which they are responsible. The new legislation made no major changes in the conditions of ownership of inventions. The Act clearly specifies that an invention belongs to the employer when it was made as part of the employee's normal duties or when conditions of the employment were such that the employee could be expected to further the interests of the employer. A significant change, however, was made in the compensation of the employed inventor. In the case of an employee-owned invention, the companies may no longer remove the inventors 1 common law rights through employment contracts. In the case of an employer-owned invention, the employee is now entitled to a "fair" share of any outstanding benefits flowing from the patent. In this case, the Act also provides the guidelines for calculating this share. One major problem of the present Patent
Act is the definition of what is understood by an "outstanding benefit to the employer". 11 Littler and Pearson (1979) conducted a questionnaire survey among a sample of The Times Top 1000 companies in order to examine industiy's opinion on this problem and the reactions to the Act. 12 They found that the reactions in industry were generally unfavorable. Among the concems expressed were, for example, that the Act would encourage secrecy among R&D Professionals and that it singles out only one group of individuals, namely the inventors to the exclusion of others working in an inventive capacity. Most companies had problems in taking adequate steps to meet the requirements of the new law. They had to consider how they intent to interpret the "fair share" and "outstanding benefit" clauses. Standards, the amount of compensation involved is rather small. "Nevertheless, in conjunction with employment pratices that also reward innovative contributions, they (compensation guidelines) have had a noticeable effect on Japanese inventiveness. Within ten years of the law's enactment, the number of patent applications from Japanese Citizens had more than tripled to well over 100,000 a year." 13 However, it is questionable whether this mono-variable explanation should be taken at face value.
II. 2. Intentions of the German Law and their Evaluation
The Intentions followed by the German Law can be separated in two major aspects:
-a legalistic aspect to bridge the gap between two legal approaches,
-an economical aspect to encourage inventive activities.
The German Employees' Inventions Act was created as a social balance between the employer and the employee. On the one hand, the general German labor law assumes that the owner of a business is considered the owner of the product of that business, and that every employee owes a duty of fidelity to his employer. On the other hand, the law states that an invention originales with the inventor, who thus has the right to receive patent or Utility model protection for the invention. The German Employees' Invention Act tries to bridge this legal conflict between patent and labor law in case of employee inventions. 14 Additionally, when the German Employee's Inventions Act was introduced in 1957, two major economic objectives were targeted. First, the law was established to encourage inventiveness and to increase the rate of invention in the economy. Secondly, the compensation guidelines were expected to motivate inventors, which should lead to an increased work Performance that in Orkin, N., (1984) -the experiment is especially suited for a restricted set of relevant factors,
-it is possible to evaluate individual variables and trade-offs between them, -a decompository approach fits real-life decision-making processes quite well.
Relevant Variables and their Levels
The variables used in the experiment need to meet the following requirements:
-they have to be relevant and discriminating. In this study, the empirical relevance of our variables was established by the Interviews which were held prior to the experiment.
-the variables should be independent of eachother in order to avoid redundancy effects.
-the set of variables must be sufficient small. Green/Srinivasan (1978) recommend a set of five to six variables, otherwise the interviewees will be confronted with an "Information overload". 20
For each variable two levels were chosen in order to further constrain the complexity of the experimental design. It is important to note that in order to 19 for a discussion of intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation and their influenae on the working satisfaction, see Herzberg receive reliable empirical results, the values of the levels should "be made larger than reality but not so large as to be unbelievable". 21 Our set of variables and their levels is described in Table 1 . 
Estimating the Utility Function
After completing the collection of data, a model must be generated that transforms ordinal preference judgements (rankings) into part-worths of each variable level. In this study the most common model in conjoint measurement is used, namely the additive compensatory model of main effects. 24 The preference functions are normalized so that the sum of the absolute values of the part-values equals 100%. The empirical findings of this study are presented in the following chapter.
III. 2. Empirical Results
The main results of a conjoint analysis are the relative importance of the variables used in the analysis part-worths of the variable levels and, as a measure of the validity of the analysis, the adjusted R-squares (ad). R^). 25 Part-Worths can be used to create different segments of the respondents.
III. 2. 1. Aggregate Data
An overview of the aggregated empirical data is given in Table 2, showing the group statistics. Based on 98 valid respondents, the estimated group Utility function has reached an adjusted R-square of 0.917, which indicates that the model does an exceptional job of Atting the data. Aggregated over all respondents, the variable that measures "Income Increase" potential receives the highest relative importance with 31.89%, while the variable "Particapation in
Training Programs" is given the lowest weight (11.72% relative importance).
"Independence", "Responsibility" and "Income structure" as incentive variables are found in between these extremes with a relative importance of 20.48%, 19.52% and 16.39%, respectively (in parentheses, the Standard errors are given). The "distribution of preferred levels" which provides a way of examining the degree of heterogeneity or segmentation in the sample is illustrated in The degree to which these percentages differ from 0% or 100% indicates the degree of heterogeneity for each variable. There is greatest variability for the variables "Income Structure" (29.08% vs. 70.92%), "Participation in Training
Programs" (27.04% vs. 72.96%), and Responsibility (21.94% vs. 78.06%). If respondents are heterogeneous, like in this study, using the group statistics as a way to summarize the results of the study is to be considered with caution.
Therefore, it is more appropriate to create different segments (Clusters) of respondents with more homogeneous preference structures.
III. 2. 2. Segmentation of the Sample
In order to explore such preference structures, a clustering of the individual Utility functions is performed. A Cluster analysis was conducted with the part-worths of all individuals. Four Clusters were derived using Ward's method with squared Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity. In a first step, outliers were excluded from the analysis by the single-linkage procedure Finally, Cluster 4 (n=13) can be characterized by R&D researchers and scientists, who strongly prefer increased responsibility as their most favored incentive (part-worth of2.269 / relative importance 49.94%). In this segment, some preference is also given to increased income.
As expected, the incentive variable "Participation in Training Programs"
is of minor relevance in all 4 Clusters (part-worths between 0.512 and 0.182 ).
The segmentation does not reveal a "training-cluster", since this variable is the least favored one with only 11% relative importance over all respondents.
Backhaus, K., Erichson, B., Flinke, W., Weiber, R., (1990): Multivariale Analysemethoden, Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung, 6th ed., Berlin/Heidelberg, p. 149-150. After completing the Cluster analysis with the resulting four homogeneous Clusters, it was asked to which degree the incentive preferences could be related to socio-economic variables. 
III. 2. 3. Quality of the Empirical Results
Reliability is a necessary, but not sufficient prerequisite for an empirical study. 29 Testing the reliability of a conjoint study can be performed in a variety of ways. 30 Here, a significance test is performed for the adjusted R-square to measure whether the results of this study differs significantly from the results of a study, based on random rank-orders. A second study was conducted evaluating 100 respondent, randomly ranking 9 scenario-cards. the hold-out data. As mentioned before, one hold-out card was added to the experimental design. However, this card was not used to estimate the respondent's Utility function. Instead, this data is "held out" of the main analysis in order to check how well the Utility functions predict these hold-out evaluations. The correlation between the predicted and the actual hold-out data could ränge from 1.0 for perfect fit to 0.0 for a total lack of fit. Aggregating the hold-out data across all respondents, the analysis reaches a mean hold-out value of 0.76. Consequently, the analysis is considered to be valid.
III. 3. Managerial Implications
The A severe problem with an extreme negative influenae on the motivation potential of the inventor is the calculation of the award. Often, the time-span between the invention and its commercialization is extremely long. Also, it is difficult to estimate the total sales that arises from the invention which is the basis for the compensation. The present value of a compensation tends to be rather small. Payments are made several years after the actual creation of the idea. Interviewees in Germany point out that the cases where significant payments were granted are quite rare. On the other hand, the cost of calculating and Controlling the compensation is rather high. In the central patent department Compensation Strategies, in: Industrial Relations, Vol. 28, No. 3, this argument is supported by Staudt et al. (1991 ), comp. Staudt, E., et al., (1991 
